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For better or for worse, the United States of America is a colossus 
astride the world. The election of Joe Biden therefore has 
ramifications for all of us. The beginning of the Biden administration 
has seen a flurry of executive orders aimed at dismantling the Trump 
legacy. 
Yet things are not that easy. Whilst it is tempting to see Biden’s 
election as a wholesale repudiation of “Trumpism”, reality is rather 
more nuanced. As we’ve noted previously on this blog, in 2020 
Donald Trump received the second most votes of any presidential 
candidate in American history (surpassed only by Biden himself). 
Whilst some of this is undoubtedly driven by strong population growth, 
that is far from the whole story. The reality is that Trump is hugely 
popular. He is also not as dissimilar from previous administrations as 
is sometimes made out. 
Consider George W. Bush – another recent president who was 
lampooned for his frequent gaffes and left power in the midst of a 
historic crisis. He, too, came to power on the back of a movement to 
put “America First” (although the language might have been less 
crude). 
Certainly, there are differences: as a former governor of Texas Bush 
assiduously courted the votes of Latin Americans. From a policy 
perspective, the Trump presidency was less distinctive than his 
rhetoric might suggest. 
Whilst the Trump presidency undoubtedly took a harder line on legal 
migration and existing undocumented migrants, he was hardly the first 
president to issue a call to “secure our borders”. Bush, too, was 
“committed to building hundreds of miles of integrated, tactical 
infrastructure along the Southern border” [1]. It might not have the 
rhetorical resonance of “build the wall” but the policy direction was 
clear. 
Previous presidents, too, whilst they might have preached the gospel 
of free trade abroad on a Sunday were only too happy to engage in 
protectionism on the Monday. The Reagan years, for example, were 
characterised by a series of “voluntary export restraints” of trade 
partners and restrictions on certain trade (e.g. textiles). 
As for other areas of social conservatism, the gap between Trump 
and his Republican predecessors was even smaller. Likewise, whilst 
Trump’s commitment to respecting democratic outcomes clearly 
leaves something to be desired, the practice of gerrymandering is 
commonplace and something of a travesty[2]. 
Where Trump differed from his predecessors was in his bellicosity 
and, perhaps, his honesty. Trump discarded any pretence of “free 
trade”, instead appealing directly to those who felt disadvantaged and 
disenfranchised by the process of untrammelled globalisation. 
His trade policy was not a break from the past – remember the Bush 
steel tariffs? – but his rhetoric certainly was. Likewise, Trump’s “wall” 
might have been merely an extension of what was already there, but 
his stridency was new. 
Not for Trump the circumlocutory talk over border control and 
“managed” legal migration. Trump was blunt, upfront and belligerent: 
Mexican immigrants were “rapists”. As a style, it grated with both other 
world leaders and many Americans. 
Yet Trump was expressing openly what had previously been alluded 
to. For all the talk about “securing our borders” (plural), everybody 
knew which border was being referred to. There was certainly no 
clamour to install new border infrastructure and fences on the 
northern border… 
In contrast, Biden has often been spoken of as a centrist and 
conciliator. Certainly, his inauguration speech sought to reach out to 
opponents in a way that Trump never did. We can certainly expect 
abrupt policy reversals in a number of areas and a return to pragmatic 
leadership, at least in those areas not constrained by a wafer-thin 
majority in Congress. 
Yet what are the broader lessons? Firstly, the recent past is not an 
aberration and neither is the United States. Every political movement 
is unique – Boris Johnson is not Donald Trump and nor is Viktor 
Orbán. Yet there are important parallels. 
A willingness to ride roughshod over established process and violate 
protocols is one of them. “Alternative facts” Those movements 
labelled as “populist” all share a common commitment to greater 
national sovereignty. All seek to speak to those for whom globalisation 
has been far from an unalloyed good. 
Usually, the twin areas highest on the list are trade[3] and migration. 
Not coincidentally, these are the two areas most closely bound up 
with Brexit. For some, concerns over migration amount to outright 
hostility, particularly towards certain migrant groups. 
The second key lesson is not to see this as binary. As humans, we 
like to categorise things: good or bad, populist or centrist, black or 
white. Our language doesn’t help: “in 2016, America voted for Trump, 
in 2020 America voted for Biden” conceals more than it illuminates. 
After all, it’s reasonable to surmise that the overwhelming majority of 
those who voted for Biden in 2020 also voted for Clinton in 2016. 
Those individuals have not changed and nor have their political views. 
In 2016, Clinton won 48.2% of the vote, in 2020 Biden won 51.3% – 
an incremental shift. Trump’s vote share actually increased between 
2016 and 2020 (from 46.1% to 46.9%), not that you’d realise it from 
media coverage. This has lessons for all of us. Trumpism and its 





[2] Respect for democratic outcomes abroad is another interesting 
case in point, although the US is far from unusual in this regard. 
[3] In some cases this rather naturally spills into areas where 
economic policy is shared. Tensions within the Eurozone are the most 
obvious example. 
 
